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## Market Setup Impact on Price Dynamics and Income Distribution A study commissioned by the North Sea Wind Power Hub consortium

Background Report

8 OCTOBER 2020





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## Market Setup Impact on Price Dynamics and Income Distribution study

- The North Sea Wind Power Hub (NSWPH) consortium has joined forces to develop concepts and solutions for supplying the large capacities required to generate energy from renewable sources at the lowest possible environmental impact and cost.
- The NSWPH programme sees it as their responsibility to structure and inform the discussion amongst policymakers on the main topics.
- One of the primary discussion topics is the market setup for hybrid projects – essentially defining how offshore windfarms are allocated to specific bidding zones and how cross-zonal capacity between these bidding zones is allocated.
- To inform these discussions, the NSWPH consortium commissioned a study by AFRY Management Consulting to provide insights into the effects of two different market setups under two physical configurations for the hub.
- The study is entitled 'Market Setup Impact on Price Dynamics and Income Distribution'.

- The 'Market Setup Impact on Price Dynamics and Income Distribution' study is co-financed by the Connecting Europe Facility of the European Union.
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## AFRY contact details

Simon Bradbury Senior Principal


simon.bradbury@afry.com

+44 7969 981178

Asimina Karakyriakou Senior Consultant


asimina.karakyriakou@afry.com

+44 7891 409565



### CONTEXT

# North Sea Wind Power Hub Consortium is focused on facilitating the large scale roll-out and integration of North Sea offshore wind



1. TenneT Netherlands, TenneT Germany, Energinet and Gasunie: 'Market setup options to integrate hybrid projects into the European electricity market' Discussion Paper

# Focus here is on price and income dynamics for two 'Market Setups' in respect of bidding and pricing arrangements for hub connected assets


STUDY OBJECTIVES		<ul> <li>In order to realise NSWPH's vision, governments and offshore wind farm (OWF) developers need to be on board. Moreover, the NSWPH programme sees it as their responsibility to structure and inform the discussion amongst policymakers on the main topics. One of the primary discussion topics is the market setup for hybrid projects – essentially defining how OWFs are allocated to specific bidding zones and how cross-zonal capacity between these bidding zones is allocated.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>To inform these discussions, this study, commissioned by the NSWPH consortium, provides insights into the effects of two different market setups under two physical configurations for the hub – the focus is on the potential impact of market setups on electricity price dynamics and on income outcomes for relevant stakeholders. The analysis is conducted for 2035 taking ENTSO-E's TYNDP 2020 'National Trends' as the basis for the market scenario.</li> </ul>		
		The market setups and physical configurations considered in the study are set out below.		
SCOP	ΡE			
SETUPS	HOME MARKET	OWFs connected to the hub bid into, are dispatched into and receive the market price for their home market (HM). Each cable between the hub and a HM is a 'hybrid' asset, with its available cross-zonal capacity constrained by capacity use by the OWFs for transmission of their generation output.		
MARKET	OFFSHORE BIDDING ZONE	A separate offshore bidding zone (OBZ) is created for the hub-connected OWFs, into which they submit bids and are dispatched. All hub-connected cable capacity is released as cross-zonal capacity to the market and the offshore generation is matched with onshore demand via market coupling.		
<b>PHYSICAL</b> CONFIGURATIONS	CORE	Includes OWFs and onshore systems associated with Denmark (DK), Germany (DE) and the Netherlands (NL), as the central elements of the hub and spoke arrangements. 12GW of OWF capacity is connected to the hub in total, with 12GW of transmission capacity to shore.		
	CORE PLUS	Broadens the hub and spoke arrangements from the Core Configuration to additionally include OWFs and onshore systems associated with Great Britain (GB) and Norway (NO). Again, 12GW of OWF capacity is connected to the hub in total, with 12GW of transmission capacity to shore (although the allocation is different than for the Core Configuration, as set out in next slides).		



INTRODUCTION: PHYSICAL CONFIGURATIONS

Core case based on 6GW, 4GW and 2GW of OWF capacity from DE, NL and DK respectively, with matching transmission capacities to respective shore


For illustration purposes




INTRODUCTION: PHYSICAL CONFIGURATIONS

Core+ case based on 4GW of OWF capacity from DE and 2GW from each of NL, DK, GB and NO, with matching transmission capacities to each shore

For illustration purposes



## Market Setup Impact on Price Dynamics & Income Distribution





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- 2. Study Characteristics & Assumptions
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- 4. Core Plus Configuration
- 5. Core vs. Core+ High-Level Comparisons
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INSIGHTS

Effects of market setup choice on overall welfare are small, but distributional impacts need to be considered in development of any bidding arrangements



1. Socio-Economic Welfare analysis includes impact on consumers and producers surpluses, and on congestion rent potential, from the wholesale electricity market.

### MAIN MESSAGE #1


# More efficient direction of flows under the OBZ setup than under the HM setup

DE DK NL €34.8/MWh €37.7/MWh €34.9/MWh 45% 49% 42% 54% 40% 57% CORE НМ DE, DK & NL 59% 41% 37% 62% 31% 67% OBZ Total cross zonal I Domestic wind transmission HM: Cross zonal - hub to market 📃 Cross zonal - market to hub **OBZ:** The charts show the utilisation rates for hub-connected transmission assets for the year 2035 by type (in the HM) and direction (in the OBZ), defined as the physical flow accounting for losses divided by the capacity of each spoke under the Core Configuration (1). The average electricity price per market is also provided under the HM setup (2). COMMENTS While overall flows on and utilisation of hub related transmission assets are broadly comparable between market setups, the OBZ setup delivers greater flows to higher priced markets. For example, in the Core Configuration, total flows over the transmission assets are at similar levels under both market setups (with the difference being around 1%). However, when switching to the OBZ setup, the utilisation of the spoke connecting the German market to the hub is higher, driven by a strong(er) price signal. 2. Prices under the OBZ setup are very similar with differences being less than 0.5% 1. Results under the Core+ Configuration show a similar direction overall

Average electricity price under the HM setup and utilisation rates by type & direction of flow




## MAIN MESSAGE #2 Socio-economic welfare under the HM setup and OBZ setup is similar





## MAIN MESSAGE #3 Large distributional transfers linked to the market setup choice




1. For example, the demand-weighted average price in NL increases by €0.14/MWh in the OBZ setup compared to the HM setup



#### MAIN MESSAGE #3A


# Hub-connected OWFs can expect lower capture revenues under the OBZ setup than under the HM setup



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### MAIN MESSAGE #3B

# Congestion rent potential is greater under the OBZ setup than under the HM setup



Annual physical flows, incl. losses by type of flow & annual total congestion income

1. While overall flows and congestion income are lower under the Core Configuration, the comparisons between the HM and the OBZ setup are of similar magnitude



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MARKET SETUPS

## Two different market setups in respect of bidding and pricing arrangements for hub connected assets are examined

MARKET SETUPS	DESCRIPTION		
HOME MARKET (HM)	<ul> <li>OWFs connected to the hub bid into, are dispatched into and receive the market price for their home market. Each cable between the hub and a HM is a 'hybrid' asset, with its available cross-zonal capacity constrained by capacity use by the OWFs for transmission of their generation output.</li> </ul>		
OFFSHORE BIDDING ZONE (OBZ)	<ul> <li>A separate offshore bidding zone (OBZ) is created for the OWFs, in which they submit bids and are dispatched. All hub-connected cable capacity is released as cross-zonal capacity to the market and, via market coupling, the offshore generation is matched with onshore demand.</li> </ul>		



PHYSICAL CONFIGURATIONS

# The different market setups are tested under two different physical configurations for the hub

### CONFIGURATIONS

**CORE CONFIGURATION** 

CORE PLUS (+)

CONFIGURATION

### PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

- Markets linked to hub:
  - Denmark (DK), Germany (DE) and the Netherlands (NL), as the central elements of the hub and spoke arrangements

- OWFs:

- DE: 6GW, NL: 4GW, DK: 2GW total of 12GW
- All OWFs within 25km from hub
- Hub:
  - Transmission connection capacity to an onshore system matching the assumed OWF capacity for that market
  - c. 200-220km from the shores of Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands
- Markets linked to hub:
  - Broadens the hub and spoke arrangements from the Core Configuration to include Great Britain (GB) and Norway (NO), in addition to DK, DE and NL

- OWFs:

- DE: 4GW, DK: 2GW, NL: 2GW, GB: 2GW, NO: 2GW total of 12GW
- All OWFs within 25km from hub
- Hub:
  - Transmission connection capacity to an onshore system matching the assumed OWF capacity for that market
  - c. 200-220km from the shores of Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands; c. 300km from the shore of GB; and c. 480km from the shore of Norway



MARKET EFFICIENCY VARIATIONS

# We have examined two market inefficiencies, linked to wind forecast errors and negative prices

#### VARIATIONS

#### **DESCRIPTION & THEORETICAL IMPACT**

- The HM setup requires reservation of transmission capacity to shore for hub-connected OWFs to cater for flows from OWFs to their home markets (domestic transmission), which reduces the capacity available for cross zonal flows (1).
- By factoring wind forecast error into the capacity allocation process within the market modelling, rather than adopting a
  perfect foresight approach, we are able to assess the effects that this has on metrics such as overall utilisation of
  offshore transmission and socio-economic welfare impact.

LINKED TO NEGATIVE ELECTRICITY PRICES

LINKED TO WIND

FORECAST ERRORS

- In the event of negative prices in a connected bidding zone, under the HM setup a potential inefficiency exists in that:
  - the hub-connected OWF is not scheduled, as, even with zero marginal cost, it is more expensive than the flows from its home bidding zone;
  - capacity on the spoke between the negative priced bidding zone and the hub is used to export from that bidding zone, via the hub and to other hub connected markets; and
  - some of the available cross-zonal capacity linked to the hub remains unused.

1. This is not the case in the OBZ, as all flows from the hub are cross zonal and capacity to allow these flows is allocated via the market coupling process.



## summary Comparison Framework

	Home Market	Offshore Bidding Zone	
MARKET SETUP	OWFs connected to the hub bid into, are dispatched into and receive the market price for their home market	OWFs connected to the hub bid into, are dispatched into and receive the market price for a specific offshore bidding zone	
PHYSICAL CONFIGURATIONS	Core Configuration	Core+ Configuration	
	Markets: DE, DK & NL	Markets: DE, DK, NL, GB & NO	
EFFICIENCY VARIATIONS	<ol> <li>Linked to wind forecast errors and the requirement to reserve transmission capacity to shore for hub- connected OWFs to cater for flows from the OWFs to their home markets (domestic transmission)</li> <li>Linked to potentially inefficient use of interconnection capacity in case of negative electricity prices in connected bidding zones</li> </ol>		



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SELECTION OF MARKET SCENARIO


# The 'National Trends' TYNDP 2020 scenario forms the basis of the market scenario for the assessment

Scenario	National Trends (NT)	Global Ambition (GA)	Distributed Energy (DE)
Climate target	Based on National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs)	Compliant with the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement	Compliant with the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement
Description	Central bottom-up scenario. In accordance with the governance of the energy union and climate action rules, as well as on further national policies and climate targets already stated by the EU member states. Compliant with the EU's 2030 Climate and Energy Framework (32 % renewables, 32.5 % energy efficiency) and EC 2050 Long-Term Strategy with an agreed climate target of 80–95 % CO <sub>2</sub> reduction compared to 1990 levels.	Looks at a future that is led by economic development in <b>centralised</b> <b>generation</b> . Economies of scale lead to significant cost reductions in emerging technologies such as offshore wind, but also imports of energy from cheaper sources are considered as a viable option.	Embraces a <b>de-centralised approach to</b> <b>the energy transition.</b> A key feature of the scenario is the role of the energy consumer, who actively participates in the energy market and helps to drive the system's decarbonisation by investing in small- scale solutions and circular approaches.



ANNUAL DEMAND

National Trends includes growing demand in most of the markets reflecting assumptions of a strong uptake in electric vehicles and heat pumps




2035 data is interpolated between 2030 and 2040 values from the TYNDP scenario

### COMMENTS

CAPACITY MIX

National Trends includes significant additional capacities across all markets to support growing demand, coal decommissioning and RES targets



### COMMENTS

- The National Trends scenario sets out its plan for 2025, 2030 and 2040. To derive 2035 values, we have linearly interpolated between the capacity values in 2030 and 2040.
- Detailed technical assumptions and characteristics are based on AFRY's in house data sets, e.g. efficiencies, start-up costs, plant availability profiles, etc.
- The National Trends scenario assumes a high growth of RES capacity, while a significant part of the fossil-fuel capacity is expected to gradually decommission. More specifically:
  - c.45% of coal capacity is decommissioned by 2035 (compared to 2025 levels);
  - onshore wind sees a 40% increase;
  - offshore wind more than doubles its capacity; and
  - solar PV increases by more than 80%.






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
RENEWABLES TARGETS AND CAPACITY BY MARKET

# RES penetration reaches 75% by 2040 in National Trends, with significant capacity in the Core / Core+ markets in 2035






## FUEL PRICES National Trends assumes increasing fuel and carbon prices



2035 data is interpolated between 2030 and 2040 values from the TYNDP scenario. Underlying profiles (e.g. monthly, seasonal, etc.) are based on AFRY's assumptions

ANNUAL GENERATION MIX


Based on National Trends inputs, the modelled generation mix has a high level of low carbon generation, with gas-fired generation still evident in Germany



RES include biofuels and small-scale RES; thermal include engines, gas turbines oil-fired generation; and storage & flexible include batteries, pumped storage, electrolysis, etc.

ANNUAL GENERATION MIX


Based on National Trends inputs, the modelled generation mix has a high level of low carbon generation, with gas-fired generation still evident in Germany



RES include biofuels and small-scale RES; thermal include engines, gas turbines oil-fired generation; and storage & flexible include batteries, pumped storage, electrolysis, etc.

PENETRATION OF LOW CARBON TECHNOLOGY AS A % OF DEMAND

## Based on National Trends inputs, there is high RES penetration levels across all Core markets




RES include biofuels and small-scale RES



#### PENETRATION OF LOW CARBON TECHNOLOGY AS A % OF DEMAND

## Based on National Trends inputs, there is high RES and hydro penetration levels across all Core+ markets



#### COMMENTS

- The figures provided here show the penetrations of each lowcarbon technology as a % of the overall national demand within each market under the Home Market setup.
- According to modelling results based on TYNDP20 National Trends input assumptions, among the core+ markets, Norway has the highest levels of low-carbon penetration (exceeding its domestic demand and thus exporting to the rest of the markets), followed by Denmark, GB and the Netherlands.
- For Norway, this is primarily due to its hydro generation. For GB, low-carbon penetration levels are driven by offshore wind and to a lesser extent nuclear and onshore wind. In Denmark, overall wind penetration levels are high.
- Overall, Netherlands and Germany have a more balanced lowcarbon generation mix, with solar, offshore and onshore wind being part of the (low-carbon) mix.





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### SUPPORTING INFORMATION

## Introduction to the Core Configuration results



#### ii. Operation of the hubconnected OWFs

iii. Operation of the NSWPH transmission assets



- This section focuses on a range of market indicators and provides comparisons of the HM setup against the OBZ setup. This background information supports and helps explain NSWPH specific operation patterns and outcomes.
- Summary of findings:
  - The relatively loose NW European electricity systems together with high RES levels keep electricity prices low, while high
    interconnector levels among the core markets mean that prices remain well-correlated. Under the OBZ setup, prices for the
    NSWPH are below national market prices.
  - Generally across the majority of indicators, the setup choice has only a marginal effect (with impact on prices less than 0.5%).
- This section provides an assessment of the generation and capture revenue of the hub-connected OWFs under both market setups.
- Summary of findings:
  - The choice of market setup has only a small impact on the generation volumes of the hub-connected OWFs overall. However, the OWFs are expected to capture a lower revenue under the OBZ setup driven by a lower Offshore Bidding Zone price compared to onshore market prices (i.e. the prices in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands). Total revenue for the hub-connected OWFs drops by 10% (i.e. from €1,130m under the HM to €1,015m under the OBZ setup).
- This section provides an assessment of the operation of the NSWPH transmission assets, incl. utilisation of the assets by type of flow and direction and annual congestion income linked to the cross-zonal operation of the assets.
- Summary of findings:
  - Limited cross-zonal flows and congestion rent potential under the HM setup, as transmission assets are mainly used for transit of the hub-connected OWF generation to home markets. By definition, under the OBZ setup all flows are considered 'cross-zonal', thus increasing cross-zonal operation and congestion rent potential. Total congestion income increases six fold (i.e. from €25m under the HM setup to €149m under the OBZ setup).



#### SUPPORTING INFORMATION

## Introduction to the Core Configuration results

iv. Societal impacts



v. Impact of potential inefficiencies



- This section provides the socio-economic welfare assessment, including impact on the consumer & producer surpluses and congestion rent potential. It also provides an overview of the impact on the cost of (thermal) dispatch.
- Summary of findings:
  - At overall market and societal levels, the choice of market setup has no noticeable impact (with net position on the overall SEW assessment being €0m). There are marked distributional effects between the market setups, however. Switching from the HM setup to the OBZ setup involves a transfer from OWFs to interconnectors (i.e. congestion rent potential) and vice versa; in other words, producers benefit under the HM setup, with interconnectors benefitting under the OBZ setup.
  - The OBZ setup makes better use of the interconnections hence using a more efficient plant mix overall and lowering cost of dispatch.
- This section provides the results of the two efficiency variations.
- Summary of findings:
  - When factoring wind forecast error into the capacity allocation process, cross-zonal flows are reduced (although the absolute impact of reduced available cross-zonal capacity is limited, given the low utilisation rates for cross-zonal flows). At the same time, transmission of hub-connected OWF generation to the home market onshore systems is higher. The net effect is marginal, with overall transmission usage reducing by less than 1% when factoring in wind forecast error.
  - No noticeable inefficiency in the Home Market setup linked to negative prices, as the occurrence and level of negative prices are correlated between the markets.



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### i. Market-wide results


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ANNUAL AVERAGE DAY-AHEAD WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES

Annual prices in the three core markets are at similar levels under HM setup



## WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES UNDER THE HOME MARKET SETUP (1)

#### COMMENTS

- The annual average electricity price in the German market is the highest of the core markets. This is primarily driven by remaining coal and gas capacity within the market combined with higher carbon and coal prices, which almost double by 2035 relative to 2020 values. This has an upward effect on prices in Germany relative to neighbouring markets.
- The average market price in Denmark is at €31.2/MWh, however the price for the (western) DK1 zone connected to the hub is higher at €34.8/MWh. For the remainder of this report, when we refer to the Danish price, we will be using the zonal price for DK1. Of the three core markets, Denmark has the higher penetration of wind which puts a downwards pressure on its electricity prices.
- Dutch electricity prices are similar to the Danish (DK1) prices.

1. For the remainder of this report when we refer to the Danish price, we will be using the zonal price for DK1 also referred to as Jutland



- Under the OBZ setup, increased (hub-connected) OWF generation flows towards Germany (triggered by a higher electricity price in Germany) thus producing a marginal downward effect on German electricity price relative to the HM setup (see section 3iii for the physical flows).


- Conversely, as less of the hub-connected OWF generation flows towards the Dutch and Danish markets under the OBZ setup, prices in these markets see a marginal increase compared to the HM setup (see section 3iii for the physical flows).
- The OBZ electricity prices are determined at an hourly level by the prices in its neighbouring markets. For a large part of the year, prices among the core markets are fairly correlated and therefore the NSWPH price is close to the core markets' price. When prices among the core markets are not correlated, usually the NSWPH price is set by the core market with the lowest price (e.g. periods when there is full export flow towards the DE shore but partial flows on the NL or DK cables) (1). The resulting average price for the OBZ is therefore lower than the average prices in the three core markets.

1. Due to losses on the IC cables, the hourly prices between the NSWPH and the respective 'price-setting' core market are never equal.

COMMENTS

#### ANNUAL AVERAGE DAY-AHEAD WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES UNDER THE TWO MARKET SETUPS


National prices are more or less the same under the OBZ setup, with the OBZ price itself below onshore market prices OBZ нм





### PRICE DURATION CURVE (PDC) OF DAY-AHEAD WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES

# Hourly prices are very similar between the three core markets in both market setups




#### COMMENTS

Price shapes are very similar between the three core markets. Electricity prices remain below €2/MWh for around 25% of the time for all three markets – driven by the high RES penetration levels as explained previously. Prices only rise above €100/MWh for less than 1% of the time.
 Results are very similar between the HM setup and the OBZ setup.

1. Here, prices below €2/MWh are considered as low-priced periods and prices over €100/MWh are considered as high-priced periods

## TOTAL RES CURTAILMENT LEVELS Total RES curtailment is similar between the two market setups



Overall RES (total wind & solar PV) curtailment levels for the core markets and the NSWPH in TWh

- system issues and / or local constraints) is at similar levels between the two market setups for both configurations (the difference between the two setups is lower than 0.5%).
  - The shift of (hub-connected OWF) curtailment from the core markets to the NSWPH results from the definition of the two market setups, given that the OWFs are no longer part of each market's generation mix and are instead part of the NSWPH zone.



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
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#### HUB-CONNECTED OWF GENERATION VOLUMES

## Load factors for the hub-connected OWFs are c. 45%



- The chart shows the hub-connected OWF generation volumes and load factors (from a commercial perspective) for each of the bidding zones under the HM setup.
- Load factors for hub-connected OWFs are very similar between the three core markets. Variations between the core markets are driven by different economic curtailment levels for offshore wind (i.e. resulting from rational economic dispatch of renewable generation, rather than driven by onshore transmission system issues and / or local constraints).



### HUB-CONNECTED OWF GENERATION VOLUMES

# Total hub-connected OWF generation is broadly similar between the two market setups

	НМ			OBZ		
Available generation at the hub platforms i.e. based on the expected wind speeds, power curves, etc.		50.10 TWh		50.10 TWh		
Available generation at the respective bidding zones i.e. under the HM setup accounting for the losses on the spokes	48.74 TWh			50.10 TWh		
Final generation & LFs post economic curtailment, at the respective bidding zones i.e. accounting for the volumes that need to be curtailed in each bidding zone	47.7	8 TWh (45.4	5%)	48.44 TWh (46.08%)		
	DE	DK	NL			
Final generation post economic curtailment, per bidding zone i.e. accounting for the volumes that need to be curtailed in each bidding zone	23.89	8.07	15.82	48.44 TWh		
<b>Domestic wind transmission of OWF (TWh) &amp; % of overall generation</b> i.e. flows into the respective home market from a physical perspective	<b>23.80</b> 99.6%	<b>7.31</b> 90.6%	<b>14.11</b> 89.2%	n.a.		
Curtailment volume – bidding zone(s)	<b>0.96TWh</b> [48.74TWh-47.78TWh]			<b>1.66TWh</b> [50.10TWh-48.44TWh]		

- Under the OBZ setup, the available generation of the hub-connected OWFs in the bidding zone is marginally higher (compared to the HM setup) due to lower overall transmission losses.
- There is higher curtailment in the OBZ setup due to convergence of prices in periods of high wind output in the core markets.
  - Under the OBZ setup, for a cross-zonal flow to be scheduled, the price difference between zones must be large enough to at least cover the costs of transmission losses along the hub to shore spoke. If price differences are small, flows will not be scheduled as the costs of losses will not be covered.
  - Under the HM setup, flows from a hub-connected OWF via the hub to its own onshore system are not cross-zonal and are not driven by price signals. Furthermore, the cost of transmission losses on the hub to shore spoke does not affect flows as they are within zone.
- More information is provided in the Annex.


More information is

physical perspective

COMMENTS

OWF CAPTURE PRICES AND RATES

Capture prices for hub-connected OWFs generally decrease under the OBZ setup Capture rate Capture price Capture price Baseload price



- COMMENTS
- The chart shows: i. the capture price, defined as the unit revenue of the hub-connected OWF per MWh accounting for the hourly profile and shape of prices and generation; ii. the baseload price, defined as the annual time-weighed average wholesale electricity price representative for a 'baseload' generator; and iii. the capture rate defined as the capture price divided by the baseload price and indicating how much of the baseload price the hub-connected OWF can capture.
- As prices in the OBZ are lower than in the core markets, we would expect hub-connected OWF revenues to be lower on a per MWh basis in the OBZ setup.
- The impact is higher for the German hub-connected OWFs, compared to Danish and/ or Dutch counterparts (i.e. the German OWF capture price is €25.94/MWh under the HM setup vs. €20.95/MWh under the OBZ setup).



OWF CAPTURE PRICE & REVENUE - COMPARISON WITH MARKET-WIDE FIGURES

## OWF capture revenues are 10% lower under the OBZ setup versus HM setup



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#### USAGE OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS

## Transmission of hub-connected OWF generation to the onshore systems is the main source of flow on hub-related transmission assets

Annual physical flows in GWh, incl. losses, by type of flow (e.g. cross-zonal or domestic transmission of hub-connected wind)

6,000MW 2,000MW 4,000MW HM 23,803 2,946 7,310 14,109 49,748 Cross Zonal (both directions) 🏾 🗰 Domestic wind transmission (from NSWPH to HM) DE DK NL i.e. from market to NSWPH and from NSWPH to market -1.0% 30,915 6,480 49,243 OBZ 10,775 Cross Zonal - market to NSWPH Cross Zonal - NSWPH to market DE DK NL - The chart shows physical flows accounting for losses on the transmission assets, as triggered by electricity price spreads, at the day-ahead stage.

- Under the HM setup, the assets are mainly used to transfer a hub-connected OWF's generation to its home market (for c. 90% of the total flow). Cross-zonal flows remain limited and, where evident, are mainly towards the German market (and specifically to export the Dutch hub-connected OWF to Germany).
- All flows under the OBZ setup are considered 'cross-zonal'. The majority of the flows are related to hub-connected OWF generation transferring wind to the
  onshore systems. Very limited flows are linked to exports from the national onshore systems (c. 2% of the total flow).

#### Home Market vs. Offshore Bidding Zone


COMMENTS

Total flows under the OBZ setup are marginally lower compared to the HM setup (by c.1%). The direction of flow changes with the NSWPH-DE spoke having
overall increased flows due to the German market's strong price signal triggering an increased flow linked to the hub-connected OWF, while the remaining
spokes have reduced overall flows. This marginal difference in the overall flow is mainly due to the (marginally) higher hub-connected OWF curtailment levels
seen in the OBZ setup (see section 3ii).



USAGE OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS

# The OBZ setup allows for increased utilisation on German spokes in response to relatively higher German prices



- The charts show the utilisation rates of the transmission assets by type and direction, defined as the physical flow accounting for losses divided by the capacity
  of each spoke.
- Under the HM setup, the transmission assets are used for around 45-50% of the time. With domestic wind transmission accounting for c. 40-45% of the flow, the assets are only used for c. 2-5% of the time to transfer cross-zonal flows.
- Utilisation under the OBZ setup varies for the different spokes connecting the onshore systems to the hub. For example, the NSWPH-DE spoke is used for c.
   60% of the time, primarily to transfer the hub-connected OWF generation to the German shore where the price signal is stronger. This leads to lower utilisation on the Danish and Dutch spokes.

#### Home Market vs. Offshore Bidding Zone

COMMENTS

 Utilisation rates for the German spoke are higher under the OBZ setup, as the German market has a higher price thus triggering a higher flow from the hubconnected OWFs. The Danish and Dutch spokes are utilised less under the OBZ setup, as reduced hub-connected OWF generation is flowing to these two markets (where the price signal is weaker). The choice of market setup has no notable impact on cross-zonal flows from the various onshore systems to the hub.



There are three main reasons why the utilisation rates for cross-zonal flows from the onshore systems, i.e. excluding the flows linked to the hubconnected OWF, remain low

Limited Price Spreads

01

02 Constrained Cross-Zonal Capacity Wholesale electricity price spreads between the three core markets are generally low, providing practically no signal for cross-zonal flows.

For example, under both setups, absolute price spreads between any of the three markets are smaller than €2/MWh for c. 85-90% of the time.

 Under the Home Market setup, cross-zonal capacity of the transmission assets is constrained to handle the internal flow of OWF generation.


For example, assuming an hour when the hub-connected OWFs are all generating at 90% load factor, and the electricity price spread between the Netherlands (low-priced zone) and Germany (high-priced zone) is strong, the maximum cross-zonal flow into the German market is 0.6GW (i.e. 6.0GW – 5.4GW), as the DE hub-connected OWF generation (generating at 90% \* 6.0GW = 5.4GW) would need to be accommodated first.

03 Physical Setup Overall utilisation of the assets is restricted by the spoke(s) with the lowest capacity.

For example, assuming an hour when the hub-connected OWF is zero and the electricity price spread between Denmark (low-priced zone) and Germany (high-priced zone) is strong, the maximum flow from Denmark into the German market can be 2GW, as it is restricted by the capacity of the DK-NSWPH spoke. In this case, the utilisation rate of the DE-NSWPH spoke is only 33.0% (2GW/6GW).



1. Wholesale electricity price spreads between the three core markets are generally low, providing practically no signal for cross-zonal flows




- Under the HM setup, absolute price spreads between any of the two markets are smaller than €2/MWh for c. 85-90% of the time.
- Under the OBZ setup, absolute price spreads between the three core markets and the NSWPH are smaller than €2/MWh for c. 85-95% of the time.
- Results based on 2018 weather patterns.




# 2. Under the Home Market setup, cross-zonal capacity of the transmission assets is constrained to handle the internal flow of OWF generation

OBZ electricity prices do not account for losses in this example. Flows do not account for losses on this illustrative chart based on actual modelled results



# 3. Overall utilisation of the assets is restricted by the spoke(s) with the lowest capacity


OBZ electricity prices do not account for losses in this example. Flows do not account for losses on this illustrative chart based on actual modelled results



### CONGESTION INCOME

# Congestion income is low under the HM setup but much greater under the OBZ setup

Annual congestion income for the different spokes in 1,000s euros, real 2019 money



Although congestion income under the OBZ setup is up to six times higher compared to the HM setup, it is still relatively low for the scale of transmission capacity available (at max. €23m/GW for the DE spoke), driven by relatively low price spreads between the core markets.



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
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELFARE ASSESSMENT

No change in overall socio-economic outcome between market setups, but there are significant distributional shifts between producers and ICs



- The chart provides a summary of the socio-economic welfare assessment for each core market and the NSWPH. The impact is relative to the HM setup.
- There is almost no impact on consumer surplus, as wholesale prices remain relatively unaffected (less than 0.5% difference in prices for any of the core markets between the two market setups). The Annex provides more information on the impact on consumer surplus.
- There is a negative impact on overall producer surplus, driven by a lower capture revenue for the hub-connected OWFs under the OBZ setup. At a market level, the negative impact on producer surplus for Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands is mainly due to the fact that the 12GW of hub-connected OWFs are no longer bidding into these national markets, but are instead bidding into the OBZ itself as, by definition, they are part of the NSWPH zone (this also explains the positive producer surplus impact for the NSWPH zone).
- Higher congestion income under the OBZ setup.

COMMENTS

- At overall market and societal levels, the choice of market setup has generally limited impact, however.

1. Positive numbers indicate a higher welfare under the OBZ setup; negative numbers indicate a lower welfare under the OBZ setup

SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELFARE IMPACT PER MARKET



**OVERALL WELFARE DISTRIBUTION** 

BREAKDOWN OF VARIABLE COST OF DISPATCH

COMMENTS

OBZ setup results in a marginally lower overall dispatch cost

IMPACT ON THE COST OF DISPATCH 20 Variable cost of generation in €m real 2019 money, OBZ setup relative to the HM setup (1) Item Impact 15 10 Fuel -€5m 8 5 0 Carbon -€4m -5 -14 -10 Other -€0m -15 -6 Fuel Carbon Other (e.g. start-up costs) -20 -€9m DE 🧰 Total DK NL

TOTAL IMPACT ACROSS THE CORE MARKETS

- The chart shows the impact on the variable cost of (thermal) generation under the OBZ setup (relative to the HM setup) for each market. The impact is indicated as 'positive' when the difference is negative under the OBZ setup (i.e. implying better use of generation mix, leading to a lower cost of dispatch).
- Overall, the OBZ setup can make better use of the interconnections flows and, hence, uses a more efficient plant mix overall with a lower cost of dispatch ( $\in$ 8.9m lower than for the HM setup).
- There is a trade-off between Netherlands and Germany. The OBZ setup better reacts to price signals and exports more flows to Germany, thereby displacing some of its thermal generation. However, with less hub-connected OWF generation going to the Netherlands under the OBZ setup, additional thermal generation needs to be dispatched there to meet demand.
- Ultimately, the difference between the two setups remains very low compared to the overall cost of dispatch for the core markets (i.e. the delta is less than 0.1% of the total cost of dispatch).

1. Positive numbers indicate a higher dispatch cost under the OBZ setup (negative impact); negative numbers indicate a lower dispatch cost under the OBZ setup (positive impact).

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


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### USAGE OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS

# The absolute impact of reduced available cross-zonal capacity is limited

#### Annual physical flows in GWh, incl. losses by type of flow (e.g. cross-zonal or domestic transmission of hub-connected wind)



- The net effect is marginal, however, with overall usage reducing by less than 1%. Additionally, intraday continuous trading may be expected to alleviate inefficiencies linked to forecast errors.



Core

USAGE OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS

COMMENTS

Reduced cross-zonal flows are offset by more wind radial operation




- The charts show the utilisation rates of the transmission assets by type and direction, defined as the physical flow accounting for losses divided by the capacity
  of each spoke.
- Factoring in the wind forecast error means that there are lower cross-zonal flows from the hub to the German market because there is constrained availability on the cable compared to the 'base case'.
- This has a consequential impact on the Danish and Dutch spokes, for both of which there is increased wind radial operation (OWF generation that would have otherwise gone to the German market due to its price signal) and reduced cross-zonal flows compared to the 'base case'.

NEGATIVE PRICES

COMMENTS

# Negative pricing has no impact as occurrence and level of negative prices are correlated between the markets



- In theory, potential inefficiencies could appear in the HM setup compared to the OBZ setup when there are negatives price in one of the price areas and not in the other one(s), leading to curtailment of the hub-connected OWF that is bidding into the HM zone with negative prices. This inefficiency can be avoided under the OBZ setup.
- However, prices in the core markets are highly correlated, meaning that, in our run to test the negative bidding inefficiency, there are no situations when there
  are negatives prices in one market and a price above €0.02/MWh in any of the other connected markets.
- NOTE: Our standard (base case) modelling suggests that occurrence of negative prices in 2035 would be almost non-existent as the number renewables power plants with subsidies that allow negative bidding dwindles. In our modelling exercise to test the negative bidding inefficiency, around 60% of all renewables was required to bid negatively to result in negative prices in the core markets in around 1.6% of periods. The main runs do not produce any negative prices.



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# Introduction to the Core+ Configuration results



### ii. Operation of the hubconnected OWFs



iii. Operation of the NSWPH transmission assets



- This section focuses on a range of market indicators and provides comparisons of the HM setup against the OBZ setup. This background information supports and helps explain some of the NSWPH specific operation patterns and outcomes.
   Summary of findings:
  - The relatively loose NW European electricity systems together with high RES levels keep electricity prices low, while high interconnector levels among the core markets mean that prices remain well-correlated. Prices in GB and Norway are less correlated than those of other hub-connected markets driven by differences in the generation mix. Under the OBZ setup, wholesale prices for the NSWPH are generally below national market prices (the only exception is Norway).
  - Generally across the majority of indicators, the market setup choice has only a marginal effect on these indicators (with impact on prices less than 0.5%).
- This section provides an assessment of the generation and capture revenue of the hub-connected OWFs under both market setups.
- Summary of findings:
- The choice of market setup has only a small impact on the generation volumes of the OWFs overall. However, the hubconnected OWFs are expected to capture a lower revenue under the OBZ setup driven by a lower Offshore Bidding Zone price compared to the onshore market prices (i.e. the prices in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and GB). The only exception is Norway where prices are lower compared to the Offshore Biding Zone. Total revenue for the hub-connected OWFs drops by 20% (i.e. from €1,055m under the HM to €849m under the OBZ setup).
- This section provides an assessment of the operation of the NSWPH transmission assets, incl. utilisation of the assets by type of flow and direction and annual congestion income linked to the cross-zonal operation of the assets.
- Summary of findings:
  - Transmission of hub-connected OWF generation to the onshore systems is the main source of flow, with some cross-zonal flow linked to Norway and GB. By definition, under the OBZ setup all flows are considered `cross-zonal' thus increasing cross-zonal operation and congestion rent potential. Total congestion income increases by 70% (i.e. from €323m under the HM setup to €542m under the OBZ setup).



# Introduction to the Core+ Configuration results

iv. Societal impacts

v. Impact of potential inefficiencies



- This section provides the socio-economic welfare assessment, including impact on the consumer & producer surpluses and congestion rent potential. It also provides an overview of the impact on the cost of (thermal) dispatch.
- Summary of findings:
  - At overall market and societal levels, the choice of market setup has generally limited (positive) impact (with net position on the overall SEW assessment of €15m). There are marked distributional effects between the market setups, however. Switching between the HM and OBZ setups involves a transfer from OWFs to interconnectors (i.e. congestion rent potential) and vice versa; in other words, producers benefit under the HM setup, with interconnectors benefitting under the OBZ setup.
- The OBZ setup makes better use of interconnections hence using a more efficient plant mix overall and lowering cost of dispatch.
- This section provides the results of the two efficiency variations.
- Summary of findings:
- When factoring wind forecast error into the capacity allocation process, cross-zonal flows are reduced. At the same time, transmission of hub-connected OWF generation to the home market onshore systems is higher. The net effect is limited with overall usage reducing by around 4% when factoring in wind forecast error.
- No noticeable inefficiency in the Home Market setup linked to negative prices, as the occurrence and level of negative prices are correlated between the markets.



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
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ANNUAL AVERAGE DAY-AHEAD WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES

Annual prices in the three core market are at similar levels, with lower prices in GB and particularly Norway



### COMMENTS


- The annual average electricity price in the German market is the highest of the core+ markets. This is primarily driven by remaining coal and gas capacity within the market combined with higher carbon and coal prices, which almost double by 2035 relative to 2020 values. This has an upward effect on prices in Germany relative to neighbouring markets.
- The average market price in Denmark is at €34.3/MWh, with Dutch electricity prices broadly the same at €34.6/MWh.
- Prices in the core plus markets, i.e. GB and Norway, are lower than prices in the three core markets and bring the potential for higher spreads between the connected markets. In GB, this is the result of high RES and nuclear penetration, while in Norway prices remain low driven by high levels of hydro generation. Norwegian prices are sensitive to the underlying weather patterns modelled and specifically to the hydro conditions. For example in the TYNDP National Trends scenario, prices for the various Norwegian zones can range between c.€3-40/MWh in 2030 and between c.€6-45/MWh in 2040.
- The two market setups are modelled under a consistent set of assumptions. This means that while the level of wholesale electricity prices could impact on the individual metrics and absolute results for the two market setups, the comparisons between the setups and ultimately the core conclusions remain unchanged.

1. For the remainder of this report when we refer to the Norwegian price, we will be using the zonal price for the most southern zone NO2



#### ANNUAL AVERAGE DAY-AHEAD WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES UNDER THE TWO MARKET SETUPS

National prices are more or less the same under the OBZ setup, with the OBZ price itself generally below onshore market prices




– The impact of the OBZ setup on annual average electricity prices is limited. For all markets, the impact is lower than 0.5%.

The OBZ electricity prices are determined – at an hourly level (1) – by the prices in its neighbouring markets. With the exception of Norway, the annual average price that results for the OBZ is lower than the national onshore prices.

1. Due to losses on the IC cables, the hourly prices between the NSWPH and the respective 'price-setting' core+ market are never equal.

### PRICE DURATION CURVE (PDC) OF DAY-AHEAD WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES

# Hourly prices are very similar between the five core+ markets in both market setups



#### COMMENTS

Price shapes are very similar between the three core markets, while GB and particularly Norway prices are generally lower across the period. Electricity prices remain below €2/MWh for around 25% of the time for all five markets – driven by the high RES and hydro penetration levels as explained previously. Prices only rise above €100/MWh for less than 1% of the time.


- Results are very similar between the HM setup and the OBZ setup.

1. Prices in low-priced periods are below €2/MWh; prices in high-priced periods are over €100/MWh



## TOTAL RES CURTAILMENT LEVELS Total RES curtailment is similar between the two market setups

Overall RES (total wind & solar PV) curtailment levels for the core markets and the NSWPH in TWh (and % of total RES generation)



- Overall renewable generation curtailment (i.e. resulting from rational economic dispatch of renewable generation, rather than driven by onshore transmission system issues and / or local constraints) is at similar levels between the two market setups for both configurations (the difference between the two setups is lower than 0.2%).
  - The shift of hub-connected OWF curtailment from the core+ markets to the NSWPH results from the definition of the two market setups, given that the OWFs are no longer part of each market's generation mix and are instead part of the NSWPH zone.



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
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### HUB-CONNECTED OWF GENERATION VOLUMES

## Load factors for the hub-connected OWF are c. 45%



- The chart shows the hub-connected OWF generation volumes and load factors (from a commercial perspective) for each of the bidding zones under the HM setup.
- Load factors for hub-connected OWFs are very similar between the five core+ markets. Variations between the markets are driven by different economic curtailment levels for offshore wind (i.e. resulting from rational economic dispatch of renewable generation, rather than driven by onshore transmission system issues and / or local constraints).



### HUB-CONNECTED OWF GENERATION VOLUMES

physical perspective

COMMENTS

# Total hub-connected OWF generation is broadly similar between the two market setups

			НМ			OBZ
Available generation at the hub platforms i.e. based on the expected wind speeds, power curves, etc.		5	0.10 TV	/h		50.10 TWh
Available generation at the respective bidding zones i.e. under the HM setup accounting for the losses of the spokes		4	8.60 TV	/h		50.10 TWh
Final generation & LFs post economic curtailment, at the respective bidding zones i.e. accounting for the volumes that need to be curtailed in each bidding zone		47.74	TWh (4!	5.41%)		48.50 TWh (46.14%)
	DE	DK	NL	GB	NO	
Final generation post economic curtailment, per bidding zone i.e. accounting for the volumes that need to be curtailed in each bidding zone	15.92	8.05	7.91	7.88	7.98	48.50 TWh
Domestic wind transmission of OWF (TWh) & % of overall generation i.e. flows into the respective home market from a physical perspective	<b>15.47</b> 97.2%	<b>7.87</b> 97.7%	<b>7.02</b> 88.7%	<b>5.62</b> 71.4%	<b>5.61</b> 70.4%	n.a.
Curtailment volume – bidding zone(s)			<b>0.86TW</b> TWh-47.			<b>1.60TWh</b> [50.10TWh-48.50TWh]


- Under the OBZ setup, the available generation of the hub-connected OWFs in the bidding zone is marginally higher (compared to the HM setup) due to lower overall transmission losses.
- There is higher curtailment in the OBZ setup due to convergence of prices in periods of high wind output in the core markets.
  - Under the OBZ setup, for a cross-zonal flow to be scheduled, the price difference between zones must be large enough to at least cover the costs of transmission losses along the hub to shore spoke. If price differences are small, flows will not be scheduled as the costs of losses will not be covered.
  - Under the HM setup, flows from a hub-connected OWF via the hub to its own onshore system are not cross-zonal and are not driven by price signals. Furthermore, the cost of transmission losses on the hub to shore spoke does not affect flows as they are within zone.

– More information is provided in the Annex.



OWF CAPTURE PRICES AND RATES

# Capture prices for hub-connected OWFs generally decrease under the OBZ setup, with the Norwegian OWFs the exception



- The chart shows: i. the capture price, defined as the unit revenue of the hub-connected OWF per MWh accounting for the hourly profile and shape of prices and generation; ii. the baseload price, defined as the annual time-weighed average wholesale electricity price representative for a 'baseload' generator; and iii. the capture rate defined as the capture price divided by the baseload price and indicating how much of the baseload price the hub-connected OWF can capture.
- As prices in the OBZ are generally lower than in most of the core+ markets, we would expect hub-connected OWF revenues to be lower on a per MWh basis in the OBZ setup, particularly in the case of German hub-connected OWFs.
- The only exception is Norway, where OWF capture prices are lower under the HM setup and thus we would expect OWF revenue to increase under the OBZ setup.



OWF CAPTURE PRICE & REVENUE - COMPARISON WITH MARKET-WIDE FIGURES

## OWF capture revenues are 20% lower under the OBZ setup versus HM setup

			НМ					
		DE 🔴	DK 🋟	NL 🚍	GB 🛟	NO 🖶	NSW	
<b>eload price</b> Wh, real 2019		37.95	34.34	34.61	32.49	22.76	31.	
<b>Capture price</b> €/MWh, real 2019	Hub-connected OWF	26.76	21.32	21.78	20.44		17.50	
	Market-wide OWF	28.00	23.53	22.72	21.44	<b>15.58</b> No additional OWF		
<b>Capture rate</b> % of baseload	Hub-connected OWF	70.5%	62.1%	62.9%	62.9%			
	Market-wide OWF	73.8%	68.5%	65.6%	66.0%	68.4%	55.69	
<b>Capture revenue</b> €m/GW, real 2019	Hub-connected OWF	106.5	85.9	86.1	80.5	<b>62.1</b> No additional OWF		
	Market-wide OWF	120.3	97.0	91.6	87.5		70.7	
II hub-connected OV al 2019	<b>WF capture revenue</b>			1,055			84	

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
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#### USAGE OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS

## Transmission of hub-connected OWF generation to the onshore systems is the main source of flow, with some cross-zonal flow linked to Norway and GB




overall increased flows due to the German market's strong price signal triggering an increased flow linked to the hub-connected OWF, while the remaining spokes have reduced flows. This marginal difference in the overall flow is mainly due to the (marginally) higher hub-connected OWF curtailment levels seen in the OBZ setup (section 4ii).



USAGE OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS

## The OBZ setup allows for increased utilisation on German and Norwegian spokes in response to price signals




 Utilisation rates for the German spoke are higher under the OBZ setup, as the German market has a higher price thus triggering a higher flow from the hubconnected OWFs. The Danish, Dutch and GB spokes are utilised less under the OBZ setup, while the Norwegian spoke utilisation rates remain around the same levels.



COMMENTS

In the Core+ case, prices in GB and Norway have a weaker correlation to prices in the three core markets, which supports cross-zonal flows



- Under the HM setup, price spreads (in either direction) between Germany and Norway are higher than €2/MWh for c. 60% of the time, while between Germany and GB price spreads are higher than €2/MWh for c. 45% of the time.
- Under the OBZ setup, price spreads between the NSWPH and both Denmark and the Netherlands are smaller than €2/MWh for c. 85% of the time. In the case
  of Germany and GB, the price spread versus the NSWPH is below €2/MWh for c. 70% of the time. Finally, the Norway-NSWPH price spread is below €2/MWh for
  c. 50% of the time.
- Results based on 2018 weather patterns.

For Denmark electricity prices are provided for the (western) DK1 zone also referred to as Jutland; for Norway electricity prices are provided for the most southern zone NO2

CONGESTION INCOME

Relatively high congestion income, driven by increased diversity between the hub-connected markets, with the OBZ setup showing greater potential

Annual congestion income for the different spokes in 1,000s euros, real 2019 money HM 20,772 322,740 187,894 41,796 66,942 Imports to DE 📰 Imports to DK 📒 Imports to NL 📰 Imports to GB 📰 Imports to NO i.e. from either 'opposite' market OBZ 28,526 164,526 200,254 41,662 18,908 542,414 41,664 45,217 Market to NSWPH NSWPH to market DE DK NL GB NO - The chart shows the estimated annual congestion income for the different spokes, provided: a. HM setup: separately for the imports into the core markets from either opposite market; and b. OBZ setup: for each spoke and for both directions (i.e. from the onshore systems to the hub, and vice versa). COMMENTS - The main source of congestion income under the HM setup is linked to cross-zonal flows towards Germany (c. 60% of the total income), as well as flows to the GB market (c. 20% of the income). When focusing on the opposite direction, the main source of this income is linked to exports from Norway (1). - Under the OBZ setup, the majority of the rent income comes from the spoke connecting the hub to the German market (c. 37% of the overall income) – as well as from the spoke connecting Norway to the hub (c. 30% of the total income). Home Market vs. Offshore Bidding Zone - Congestion income under the OBZ setup is c.70% higher compared to the HM setup (congestion income under the OBZ setup is close to €92m/GW for the Norwegian spoke and around €50m/GW for the German spoke).

1. The rent linked to exports from Norway is included in the numbers shown above (i.e. imports to DE, DK, NL & GB).



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
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELFARE ASSESSMENT

Overall socio-economic outcome is marginally better under the OBZ setup, including an increase in consumer surplus, but with distributional shifts



- The chart provides a summary of the socio-economic welfare assessment for each core+ market and the NSWPH. The impact is relative to the HM setup.
- There is almost no impact on consumer surplus (either at a market-level or overall), as wholesale prices remain relatively unaffected (less than 0.5% difference \_ between the two setups for any of the core markets). The Annex provides more information on the impact on consumer surplus.
- There is a negative impact on overall producer surplus, driven by an overall lower capture revenue for the hub-connected OWFs under the OBZ setup. At a market level, the negative impact on producer surplus for the core+ markets is mainly due to the fact that the 12GW of hub-connected OWF is no longer bidding in these national markets, but under the OBZ setup, by definition they are part of the NSWPH zone (this also explains the positive impact under for the NSWPH).
- Higher congestion income under the OBZ setup.

COMMENTS

- When a wider diversity of markets are connected to the NSWPH (as under the Core+ configuration), the OBZ setup can exhibit more notable benefits, driven by (marginally) positive effects on overall consumer wholesale electricity costs.


1. Positive numbers indicate a higher welfare under the OBZ setup; negative numbers indicate a lower welfare under the OBZ setup

#### **OVERALL WELFARE DISTRIBUTION**



BREAKDOWN OF VARIABLE COST OF DISPATCH

## OBZ setup results in a marginally lower dispatch cost, with lower fuel and carbon costs



than for the HM setup).

- The impact is stronger in the German market, due to increased flows from the hub-connected OWFs displacing some of its thermal generation. This is also the result of the larger spoke to Germany compared to the other markets (i.e. 4GW for Germany as opposed to 2GW for other markets).

- Ultimately, the difference between the two setups remains very low compared to the overall cost of dispatch for the core+ markets (i.e. the delta is less than 0.1% of the total cost of dispatch).

1. Positive numbers indicate a higher dispatch cost under the OBZ setup; negative numbers indicate a lower dispatch cost under the OBZ setup

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
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#### USAGE OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS

# Wind forecast error means that cross-zonal flows are lower, although transmission of hub-connected OWF generation to home-markets is higher




inefficiencies linked to forecast errors.



USAGE OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS

COMMENTS

## Lower utilisation rates for the spokes that are used for cross-zonal flows, although impact is somewhat mitigated by increased wind radial operation




- The charts show the utilisation rates of the transmission assets by type of use (either cross-zonal or domestic wind transmission), defined as the physical flow
  accounting for losses divided by the capacity of each spoke.
- On the German spoke, there are lower cross-zonal flows from the hub to the German market under the efficiency variation driven by a constrained availability on the cable.
- For the Danish and Dutch spokes, there is almost no impact, as reduced cross-zonal flows are offset by increased wind radial operation.
- In the case of the GB and Norwegian spokes, there are lower cross-zonal flows in either direction under the efficiency variation, but these are, to some extent, counterbalanced by increased wind radial operation (OWF generation that would have otherwise gone to the German market due to its price signal).



NEGATIVE PRICES

COMMENTS

# With more diversity in the price formation, some marginal inefficiencies could appear under the HM setup in case of potential negative prices



 In theory, potential inefficiencies could appear in the HM setup compared to the OBZ setup when there are negatives price in one of the price areas and not in the other one(s), leading to curtailment of the hub-connected OWF that is bidding into the HM zone with negative prices. This inefficiency can be avoided under the OBZ setup.

- The core+ markets are less correlated in terms of prices than the core markets, meaning that cases of negatives prices in one market and positive prices elsewhere can occur, leading to an inefficiency in the HM setup. However, the frequency of cases is still minor i.e. only 13% of the time when there are negative prices in any price area is there a price above €1/MWh in one of the other price areas.
- NOTE: Our standard modelling suggests that occurrence of negative prices in 2035 would be almost non-existent as the number renewables power plants with subsidies that allow negative bidding dwindles. In our modelling exercise to test the negative bidding inefficiency, around 60% of all renewables was required to bid negatively to result in negative prices in the core markets in around 3.2% of periods. The main runs do not produce any negative prices.

For Denmark electricity prices are provided for the (western) DK1 zone also referred to as Jutland; for Norway electricity prices are provided for the most southern zone NO2



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


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USAGE OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS

Increased overall usage under the Core+ driven by the addition of GB and Norway to the hub, adding greater diversity and increasing cross-zonal flows

Annual physical flows in GWh, incl. losses by type of flow (e.g. cross-zonal or domestic transmission of hub-connected wind)



increases cross-zonal flows and improves the usage of the NSWPH transmission assets overall under the Core+ Configuration.



SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELFARE ASSESSMENT

Effects of market setup choice on welfare are generally small, but potential benefits of the OBZ setup are enhanced under the Core+



**CORE+ CONFIGURATION** 

CORE CONFIGURATION

COMMENTS

- The chart provides a summary of the socio-economic welfare assessment for each Core or Core+ market as appropriate and the NSWPH. The impact is relative to the HM setup.
- Effects of market setup choice on welfare are generally small, but potential benefits of OBZ setup are enhanced when there is more diversity in the hubconnected markets as is the case under the Core+ Configuration.
- There are large distributional transfers linked to market setup choice under both configurations.

1. Positive numbers indicate a higher welfare under the OBZ setup; negative numbers indicate a lower welfare under the OBZ setup




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OVERVIEW OF BID3




## BID3 is the leading electricity market simulation software – combining powerful simulations with user-friendliness





**OVERVIEW OF BID3** 


BID3 projects physical operation (generator output, electricity flows, emissions) and economic behaviour (electricity prices, revenues)



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#### MARKET EFFICIENCY VARIATIONS - APPROACH


# Potential inefficiencies could appear under the HM setup due to wind forecast inaccuracies leading to an 'over-reservation' of the transmission assets



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#### MARKET EFFICIENCY VARIATIONS - APPROACH

Potential inefficiencies could appear when there are negative prices. However no negative prices were observed in our standard modelling, so an additional run was made to artificially create these situation and observe the outcomes






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SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELFARE ASSESSMENT

COMMENTS

Wind error margin has limited impact on socio-economic outcomes



- The chart provides a summary of the socio-economic welfare assessment for each core market and the NSWPH. The impact is relative to the HM setup.
- Factoring in the wind error margin causes marginal shifts of flows, with reduced flows going to Germany causing a marginal increase in German prices mirrored by a decrease in prices in Netherlands and Denmark. This has a negative effect for the German consumers and a positive effect for Dutch and Danish consumers.
- Conversely, reduced flows to Germany result in a benefit for the German producers, with the opposite applying for the Dutch and Danish producers.
- Overall for the three markets, the wind margin error means marginally higher congestion rent potential due to greater price spreads, lower revenues for
  producers, and improved consumer surplus due to lower prices. The net impact is negligible, however.


1. Positive numbers indicate a higher welfare under the inefficiency HM run setup; negative numbers indicate a lower welfare under the base case HM run setup



SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELFARE ASSESSMENT

COMMENTS

Wind error margin has limited impact on socio-economic outcomes



SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELFARE IMPACT PER MARKET

- The chart provides a summary of the socio-economic welfare assessment for each core+ market and the NSWPH. The impact is relative to the HM setup.
- Factoring in the wind error margin causes marginal shifts of flows, with reduced flows going to Germany causing a marginal increase in German prices mirrored by a decrease in prices in all the remaining connected markets. This has a negative impact on the German consumers and a negative on the German producers. The opposite is true for the other connected markets.
- Overall for the five markets, it means marginally higher congestion rent potential due to greater price spreads, lower revenues for producers capturing a lower price (especially in GB and Norway) and improved consumer surplus due to lower prices. The net impact is limited, however.

1. Positive numbers indicate a higher welfare under the inefficiency HM run setup; negative numbers indicate a lower welfare under the base case HM run setup

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#### ADDITIONAL DETAILS

## Q1: Why is consumer surplus effect of switching to OBZ setup negative in the Core configuration and positive in the Core+?

### **Core Configuration**

- The overall consumer surplus effect is driven by the combination of consumer surplus effects in each of the Core markets. In aggregate, the switch to OBZ setup leads to a reduction in consumer surplus across the three markets collectively. The following points contribute to this overall position:
  - The biggest impact is on the Dutch consumers. The OBZ setup leads to reduced hub-connected OWF flows to the Dutch market. In this setup, flows from the hub to an onshore system occur in response to price signals between two price zones. Because the price signal is weaker in the Netherlands (with generally lower prices), some of the NL hub-connected OWF is flowing towards the other markets (e.g. utilisation on the NL spoke has dropped from 40% to 31%). This pushes prices upwards in the Dutch market for example the demand-weighted average price increases by €0.14/MWh.
  - There is a marginal impact on the German and Danish consumers. For example, the impact on (demand-weighted average) prices in Germany
    is less than €0.01/MWh.

### **Core+ Configuration**

The addition of GB and NO to the hub leads to an overall positive consumer surplus. This is driven by a positive impact mainly on the German consumers, benefiting from increased flows from zones with notably lower prices (i.e. GB & NO).



ADDITIONAL DETAILS

## Q2: How are losses treated?

#### Home Market (HM) setup

- Under the Home Market setup, losses on the transmission lines that connect each (hub-connected) OWF to its home market are handled explicitly. This means that the OWF volume that reaches its respective onshore connection point is reduced by e.g. 2.7% for the core markets (1). Under the HM setup, OWFs bid into their respective home market at a price close to €0/MWh. As long as they are within the merit order, the OWF volumes are dispatched into the national systems.
- When there is a price spread among the connected markets large enough to trigger a cross-zonal flow, then the OWF generation may be 'directed' to a different market (instead of its home market). This price spread needs to be large enough to at least cover the costs of transmission losses along the hub to shore cable. In this case, the OWF will receive the price of the home market and this OWF volume will be classed as 'cross-zonal flow'.

### Offshore bidding Zone (OBZ) setup

- Under the Offshore Bidding Zone setup, by definition, all OWF volumes are classed as cross-zonal and therefore losses are handled implicitly. This means that in order for a cross-zonal flow to be triggered between the hub and a connected market, the price spread needs to be large enough to at least cover the costs of transmission losses along the hub to shore cable.
- For example between the hub and each of the core markets the following constraint needs to be met: PriceMarketA > PriceHub / (1-2.7% losses), for a flow to be triggered from the hub towards Market A.

1. The Core+ markets include a higher loss factor to account for a longer cable to the shores (e.g. 3.1% for the connection to GB; 4.0% for the connection to Norway).

